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Abstract: The paper analyses the reasons for departures from strong rationality of 
German business cycle forecasts based on annual observations from 1963 to 2004. 
We rely on forecasts from the joint forecast of the so-called "six leading" forecasting 
institutions in Germany. We test for a non-linear relation between forecast errors and 
macroeconomic fundamentals and find evidence for such a non-linearity for inflation 
forecasts. Evidence from probit models further suggests that some macroeconomic 
fundamentals – especially monetary factors – correlate to large positive or negative 
forecast growth and inflation forecast errors. 
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An overwhelmingly broad area of research reflects on the amount of forecast errors made by 
professional forecasters (see, for example, Fildes and Stekler, 2002, for a recent survey). To a 
large degree such studies report departures from the idea of strong rationality of these fore-
casts. In particular, while the forecasts are mostly found to be unbiased, most recent papers 
find them to be inefficient (see Döpke and Fritsche, 2004, Hagen and Kirchgässner, 2001, for 
German data). These findings have led some researchers to the conclusion that forecasters 
may have other goals than simply making the smallest possible forecast error (see, for exam-
ple, Laster, Bennet and Geoum, 1999). Another possible explanation may be seen in an 
asymmetric loss function of the forecasters (Elliot, Komunjer and Timmermann, 2004). In 
this paper, we offer yet another possible explanation for the reported inefficiency of forecasts.  
We argue that the standard result of at least inefficient forecasts may rest on some influential 
outliers. In other words: seldom, but large forecast errors might be at the root of the alleged 
irrationality of macroeconomic forecasts. This idea is also consistent with some prominent 
stylised facts of forecast errors. For example, Heilemann (1998) as well as Loungani (2000), 
among others, document that forecasters have usually missed upcoming recessions. These 
findings point to the possibility that large forecast errors occur as rare events, which are seen 
as a major challenge for forecasters (see, for example, Hendry and Clements, 2001). Further-
more, we argue that this may be caused by the fact that the relationship between macro vari-
ables – especially monetary variables – that are usually used to base a forecast and the fore-
cast errors is non-linear. An explanation for this might be found in the literature on how ex-
pectations are formed (Ball and Croushore, 2003). 
The first step in our empirical research is, therefore designed to identify outliers in equations 
usually used to test for rationality. In a second step, we test for non-linearities in the relation 
between some macroeconomic fundamentals and forecast errors. The estimations refer to the 
forecasts of so-called "six leading" economic research institutions in Germany (the "joint 
analysis") made in autumn of each year for the subsequent calendar year. These forecasts are Discussion Papers   498 
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probably the most recognised predictions in Germany and, furthermore, are in themselves a 
sort of a consensus forecast. (see Stäglin, 1998, for a description of the "joint forecast").1 
Our results indicate that reducing the influence of "outliers" by robust estimation methods still 
leads to the rejection of the rationality hypothesis. Turning to a possible non-linearity, we use 
RESET tests, the arranged regression test of Tsay (1989), and the threshold test as described 
in Hansen (1997). Our main finding is that non-linearities may indeed help to understand the 
errors made by the institutes. For example, we find a non-linear relation between lagged eco-
nomic variables, such as monetary ones, and the occurrence of a forecast error. To check 
whether a rather simple form of non-linearity is appropriate or not, we also check whether the 
relation differs between overestimations and underestimations. This kind of analysis relies on 
probit models. From our findings, we conclude that incorporating non-linearities into the 
forecast models is one of the prime candidates in improving the forecast record. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the evidence on the sources of forecast 
errors made by professional forecasters with a special emphasis on German data. Section 3 
analyses the real-time forecast errors of the six institutes and presents the results of standard 
tests for rationality of the forecasts. Section 4 presents the results of the non-linearity tests. 
Section 5 shows the findings based on probit models. A final section provides conclusions. 
2  Sources of forecast errors 
Most studies on business cycle forecasts in Germany conclude that, in general, the forecasts 
are unbiased, but not necessarily efficient (see Döpke and Fritsche, 2004, for a survey on 
recent evidence regarding to German data). Döpke and Langfeldt (1995) present evidence 
supporting the idea that output is generally underestimated in an upswing and overestimated 
during a contraction period. A similar result is reported by Granger (1996) using data from an 
international survey of forecasters. Loungani (2000) also reports that forecasters regularly 
miss recessions. 
                                                                         
1 The data set from which the time series were drawn is described in detail in Döpke and Fritsche (2004). We rely 
on annual data from 1963 to 2004. The growth forecast is the predicted growth rate of real GNP for the time span 
1983 to 1989 and real GDP for all other years. The inflation forecast is the predicted change of the deflator of 
private consumption. As regards the actual outcome, we used the first published data. The numbers refer to West 
Germany up to 1992, and to the unified Germany from 1993 to present. Discussion Papers   498 
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In Figure 1 we have plotted the forecast errors together with recession periods (shaded) in 
accordance with the business cycle and growth cycle concept of the Economic Cycle Re-
search Institute (ECRI).2 In almost all cases, large overestimations of growth coincide with 
recessions using either the traditional business cycle concept or the growth cycle concept. 
Underestimations of growth coincide with pre-recession periods where growth rates seem to 
be above average. With regard to inflation forecast errors, the relationship is unclear.  
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Regressions of the respective forecast errors on a constant and a dummy for the business cycle 
dates – for robustness check the dummies were defined according to mentioned different 
concepts – confirms the hypothesis of a relationship between forecast errors and recession 
periods. 
                                                                         
2 The business cycle concept refers to peaks and troughs in levels, whereas the growth cycle concept refers to 
peaks and troughs in the growth rate of GDP. Owing to the annual frequency used here, the dating can only be 
very imprecise. A year was counted as a recession year if more than 6 months were in the recession regime. For 
a more detailed description of the underlying business cycle dating procedure, refer to 
http://www.businesscycle.com. 
3 The business cycle dating stems from ECRI (www.businesscycle.com). Discussion Papers   498 
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according to … 
Estimations results (s.e. in parenthesis) 
  Growth forecast errors  Inflation forecast errors 
Business cycle con-
cept 
t t * * )* 60 . 0 ( ) 25 . 0 (
g
t D 79 . 1 20 . 0 e ε + + − =   t t ) 43 . 0 ( ) 26 . 0 ( t D 51 . 0 06 . 0 e ε + − =
π  
Growth cycle  
concept 
t t ) 44 . 0 ( ) 39 . 0 (
g
t D 22 . 0 16 . 0 e ε + + =   t t )* 30 . 0 ( ) 14 . 0 ( t D 59 . 0 23 . 0 e ε + − =
π  
Note: The equations were estimated using Newey-West HAC standard errors & covariances (lag 
truncation = 3). *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively. 
Table 1 shows that with regard to the growth forecasts and using the business cycle concept, 
the dummy is significant at 1 per cent and the coefficient has a positive value. According to 
this equation, the "six leading institutes" tended to overestimate GDP growth in recession 
periods (business cycle concept) by 1.6 percentage points on average. With regard to the in-
flation forecasts and using the growth cycle concept, the dummy is significant at 10 per cent 
and the coefficient has a negative value. According to this results, the "the six leading insti-
tutes" tended to underestimate inflation in growth cycle recession periods by –0.36 percentage 
points. 
3  Testing for rationality 
We start our empirical analysis with standard measures of forecasting accuracy and standard 
tests of forecast rationality. Table 2 presents some standard statistics.4  
-  The mean error (a positive (negative) value of the mean error corresponds to an un-
der(over)estimation of the variable) is not significantly different from zero as can be 
seen from a regression on a constant.5 
-  The values of the mean absolute error as well as the root mean squared error show that 
forecast errors in general and over a longer time span are not small – a fact well 
known to professional observers but not necessarily in the public debate. The forecast 
error is about one third of the variance of the time series. 
                                                                         
4 Unless otherwise stated, our notation follows the textbook of Diebold (1998). Discussion Papers   498 
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-  We applied the normality test as described in Doornik and Hansen (1994). The hy-
pothesis of normality is not supported for growth forecast errors. For inflation forecast 
errors, the normality hypothesis is supported. 
Table 2: The track record of the forecasts 
 




Mean error  0.27  -0.07 
Mean absolute error  1.31  0.77 
Root mean squared error  1.77  1.01 
Regression of forecast error on a constant (p-value, Newey-
West corrected) 
0.33 0.78 
RMSE as a percentage of variance of predicted series  0.35  0.29 
Doornik-Hansen-Normality test (p-value)  0.004  0.36 
Note: The first three rows are shown as percentage points 
-  Figure 2 shows the histograms for the growth and inflation forecast errors, respec-
tively. The distribution of growth forecast errors is leptocurtic with a slightly longer 
right tail. Some "large" forecast errors dominate both outer tails. Inflation forecast er-
rors are fairly normally distributed with a kurtosis slightly above 3 and a longer left 
tail which points to the tendency of forecasters to underestimate inflation. 
                                                                         
5 This refers to the overall sample. Discussion Papers   498 
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In the next step we turn to unbiasedness and efficiency/rationality tests.6 Table 3 presents the 
respective results. 
                                                                         
6 In all cases, we checked for absence of autocorrelation and for homoscedasticity since the respective test 
statistics are only valid under these assumptions. The condition is fulfilled for all growth specifications but not for 
inflation specifications. We therefore used a Newey-West correction. The detailed results of Breusch-Godfrey LM 
tests and White heteroscedasticity tests are not reported here but are available from the authors on request. Discussion Papers   498 
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Table 3: Results of rationality tests 
 




  OLS LAD OLS LAD 
Test for unbiasedness (p-value)  0.33 1.00 0.69 0.22 
Test for weak rationality (p-value)  0.75  0.54  0.001  0.001 
i)  Test for strong rationality based on short-term interest rates 
(Wald test, p-value) 
0.10  0.06  0.33 0.50 
ii)  Test for strong rationality based on short-term real interest 
rates (Wald test, p-value) 
0.61 0.32 0.32 0.58 
iii)  Test for strong rationality based on interest rate spread  
(Wald test, p-value) 
0.15  0.04  0.31 0.41 
iv)  Test for strong rationality based on the change in real exter-
nal value of the currency (Wald test, p-value) 
0.45 0.89 0.24 0.44 
v)  Test for strong rationality based on the change in the oil 
price  
(Wald test, p-value) 
0.22 0.67 0.33 0.57 
vi)  Test for strong rationality based on the change in OECD 
industrial production (Wald test, p-value) 
0.57 0.55 0.05  0.04 
vii)  Test for strong rationality based on the monetary stance 
indicator (Wald test, p-value) 
0.01  0.02  0.23 0.28 
 
-  First, we test for the unbiasedness of the forecasts. To this end, it is possible to make 
use of the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression, i.e. running the following regression: 
t t , 1 t 1 0 1 t u y ˆ y + β + β = + +  (where  1 t y +  is the "actual" in period t+1 and  t 1 t y ˆ +  is the forecast 
made in period t for period t+1) and testing the hypothesis  1 ^ 0 : H 1 0 0 = β = β . The 
relevant column in the table reports the p-value of this test under the header "OLS". 
Both forecasts are classified as unbiased. 
-  As a test for the forecasts’ rationality we extend the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression by 
exogenous variables, i.e. estimating the equation  t 1 t 2 t , 1 t 1 0 1 t u X y ˆ y + β + β + β = − + +  by 
OLS where  1 t X −  represents a respective exogenous variable. We use a standard Wald 
test to check the hypothesis  0 ^ 1 ^ 0 : H 2 1 0 0 = β = β = β  (Holden and Peel, 1990). If 
this hypothesis cannot be rejected, the forecast has to be considered as rational. We 
test a weak and a strong version of this test.  Discussion Papers   498 
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-  The "weak" version refers to a test for autocorrelation of the forecast errors. For an op-
timal forecast, one should be unable to find any variable which helps to forecast the 
errors. As a consequence, the lagged forecast errors should also be non-informative for 
the ex ante error. In the literature, this is sometimes referred to as a test for "weak effi-
ciency" or "weak rationality" (Kirchgässner, 1984). We define  1 t t , 1 t 1 t e y ˆ y + + + = −  and 
estimate  t t 2 t , 1 t 1 0 1 t u e y ˆ y + β + β + β = + + . We report the p-value of the Wald test that 
0 ^ 1 ^ 0 : H 2 1 0 0 = β = β = β  under the header "OLS". The test is unable to reject the 
null of an efficient use of the available information for growth forecasts but not for in-
flation forecasts. However, one should keep in mind that the information set repre-
sented by the lagged forecast error is rather limited. 
-  A stronger test version of the hypothesis of efficient information processing – some-
times referred as "rational expectation formation" or "strong rationality" – stipulates 
that the forecast errors are uncorrelated to any variables known to the forecasters at the 
time of the forecast. Using these kind of arguments Hagen and Kirchgässner (2001), 
Kirchgässner and Savioz (2001) as well as Harvey (1991) find evidence that forecast-
ing equations based e.g. on monetary variables outperform the institutes' forecasts. 
This implies that the latter could not be efficient. However, as it is emphasised by 
Tichy (1994), tests which rely on exogenous variables are problematic since it is un-
clear what the forecasters exactly know about the future stance of the cycle. Therefore 
we selected a number of macroeconomic variables from the second quarter of the year 
in which the forecast is made and repeat the test with exogenous variables instead of 
the lagged forecast errors as explanatory variables. If the hypothesis of the above-
mentioned Wald test cannot be rejected, the forecast has to be considered as rational in 
a strong sense. The results (estimated by OLS) are reported under the header "OLS".In 
particular, we use the following exogenous variables: 
i)  Short-term interest rates as of the second quarter of the forecasting year as a 
proxy for the stance of monetary policy. 7 
ii)  Real short-term interest rates as of the second quarter of the forecasting year as 
a further proxy for the stance of monetary policy.8 
                                                                         
7 We use 3-month FIBOR/EURIBOR as a measure of short-term interest rates. Discussion Papers   498 
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iii)  Interest rate spread as of the second quarter of the forecasting year as a poten-
tially good leading indicator (Estrella, Rodrigues and Schich 2003).9 
iv)  The change over previous year as of the second quarter of the forecasting year 
of the real external value of the domestic currency to capture possible ex-
change rate shocks. 
v)  The change over previous year as of the second quarter of the forecasting year 
of the oil price as a proxy for supply side shocks. 
vi)  The change over previous year as of the second quarter of the forecasting year 
of industrial production in all OECD countries to take into account demand 
fluctuations outside Germany. 
vii)  A monetary policy "stance" indicator constructed along the lines proposed by 
St-Amant (1996) and Gottschalk (2001).10 The indicator measures the devia-
tion of the real short-term interest rate from its model-based equilibrium level. 
The results of the strong rationality tests indicate that rationality is sometimes rejected – more 
often for growth than for inflation forecasts. It is particularly puzzling that past short-term 
interest rates, the interest rate spread or the monetary policy indicator of the respective second 
quarter of the forecasting year – information which is definitely known to all the involved 
forecasters – help to improve the fit of the equation and, thus, violate the rationality of the 
forecasts (see Kirchgässner and Savioz, 2001): Even a brief examination of the joint forecast 
publication will make apparent that virtually all forecasters agree on the importance of mone-
tary policy for the business cycle. As a consequence, the forecasters closely monitor short-
term interest rates. Since underestimations of growth are strongly related to recession periods, 
this points to the possibility that forecasters tend to underestimate the dampening effects of 
some macroeconomic variables – notably changes in the stance of monetary policy or external 
demand.  
                                                                         
8 The real interest rate is the short-term interest rate deflated by CPI inflation. 
9 The term spread is defined as "Umlaufsrendite" minus 3-month FIBOR/EURIBOR. 
10 We use a structural VAR approach to disentangle expected real interest rates into that part driven by monetary 
policy and that part reflecting other sources. The identification scheme relies on the applicability of the Fisher 
equation and uses long-run restrictions as in Blanchard and Quah (1989). Discussion Papers   498 
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The often-stated hypothesis that the alleged poor quality of Germany's business cycle fore-
casts is due to external shocks is, on the other hand, not supported – at least not by this test.  
Turning to inflation forecasts, the OECD industrial production has some explanatory power 
for the inflation forecast error. External shocks seem to matter for inflation forecast errors 
rather than growth forecast errors. All in all, our results give support to doubts concerning the 
rationality of forecasts. 
To gain further evidence on potential reasons for the rejection of the hypothesis of strong 
rational expectations, it might be useful to consider whether single influential outliers are 
responsible for this result. Thus, we employ techniques of outlier detection and robust estima-
tion techniques. In particular, we first take a look at the leverage-versus-squared-residuals 
plot. A point above the horizontal line shows years with a high leverage, ie years with a par-
ticular influence on the estimated regression. Years with point far to the right represent years 
with a high residual. It is possible to drop the outliers from the data. If these observations can 
reasonably be assumed to be valid within the respective model under consideration, it makes 
more sense to re-run the regressions testing for strong rationality using a robust estimator 
(Greene, 2003 ch. 16). A possible estimator is given by the least absolute deviations estimator 
(LAD).11 We suspect that the rejection of the hypothesis of strong rationality depends of a 
limited number of influential observations. If this is true, the robust estimator should not re-
ject the hypothesis of rationality in those cases where the OLS based results lead to a rejection 
of the hypothesis. The respective robust results are reported under the header "LAD" in table 
3. 
                                                                         
11 LAD is consistent and asymptotically normal under quite broad conditions. Discussion Papers   498 
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To begin with, figure 3, panels(a) and (b) depict the leverage-versus-squared-residuals plots 
for the Holden/Peel-type test for forecast rationality. Visual inspection of the exhibits makes 
clear that, depending on the exogenous variable included in the test, some data points have a 
relatively high leverage, i.e. influence the regression more than others. The figures reveal that 
regarding the growth forecasts some data points have a particularly large influence on the 
estimated relation. In case of all monetary variables, years frequently seen as periods of 
marked monetary tightening (1971, 1974 and 1982) show a large leverage. As regards the real 
exchange rate, the value for the year 1977 appears to be important for the estimated coeffi-
cients. While one would have expected the observation of the year 1980 in case of the oil 
price, since this years marks the beginning of the second oil price crisis, the fact that the data 
points for 1973 or 1974 show not similar influence comes as a surprise. Looking at the indus-
trial production abroad, 1976 is the observation with the strongest influence on the coeffi-
cients and, thus, on the test result for rationality. In most cases the observation in 1975 is an 
outlier, that is, the year represents a huge miss-prediction, but with no strong influence on the 
estimation results. 
Regarding the inflation forecasts, the picture is less systematic. The year 1974 appears to be 
influential in all equation with monetary variables as regressors, but several other years also 
appear to be important with no obvious systematic pattern. For all equations, 1996 appears to 
be a large, though not influential outlier. In this year, the raw material prices witnessed an 
marked drop. 
The results for the rationality tests based on robust estimation methods show no remarkable 
difference to the OLS results. From that perspective, influential outliers do not seem to be the 
prime suspect as a reason for the rejection of rationality in several cases. 
4  Testing for non-linearities 
The results of the previous parts of this paper suggest that the investigated macroeconomic 
forecasts for Germany did not pass tests on strong rationality, namely the test of whether 
exogenous variables could improve the forecasts. In this section, we aim to gain further in-
sights into the nature of the relationship between forecast errors and the state of the economy. 
In particular, we test for a possible non-linear relationship between lagged macroeconomic 
variables and forecast errors. Discussion Papers   498 
Testing for non-linearities 
  15
Consider, for example, the test for rationality by running regressions of the form 
t 1 t 2 t | 1 t 1 0 1 t u X y ˆ y + β + β + β = − + + . To simplify the analysis, we restrict  1 1 = β  - which is satis-
fied because the tests in section 2 revealed, that the unbiasedness condition is fulfilled - and 
test the equation  t 1 t 2 0 1 t t | 1 t 1 t u X e y ˆ y + β + β = = − − + + +  where  1 t X −  stands for all the above-
mentioned variables. 
With this equation at hand, we tested for non-linearity by applying a Ramsey (1969) RESET 
test with power 2 and 3 and a Tsay (1989) arranged regression test. Furthermore, we used a 
threshold estimation as described in Hansen (1997) with bootstrapped critical values to be 
aware of small sample problems.12 
The results given in Table 4 indicate only one (and quite weak) non-linear relationship be-
tween growth forecast errors and a macroeconomic variable, namely the interest rate spread. 
The significance level of the Tsay (1989) test delivers a p-value of 0.11 and the Hansen 
(1997) test gives a p-value of 0.14. There are no signs of non-linearity between growth fore-
cast errors and any other indicator.13 There are however signs of a non-linear relationship 
between inflation forecast errors and several macroeconomic indicators. As Table 5 indicates, 
there are signs of a non-linear relationship between inflation forecast errors on the one hand 
and short-term interest rates, interest rate spread (weak evidence, p-value for Tsay (1989) test: 
0.11, p-value for Hansen (1997) test: 0.14) and the monetary policy stance indicator on the 
other hand. 
 
                                                                         
12 The calculations were made using RATS 5.04 and the procedures RESET.SRC, TSAYTEST.SRC, THRESH-
OLD.SRC available at http://www.estima.com. The critical values for the Hansen (1997) test were obtained by 
using the bootstrapping procedure embedded in THRESHOLD.SRC using 5,000 repetitions. 
13 Note, however, that the threshold procedure trims the range of the ordered time series by 15 per cent from 
each side. Especially for the oil price, there is some evidence that the relationship between oil price changes and 
GDP growth is highly non-linear and dominated by very large spikes in the oil price. Owing to the limitation of data 
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For those indicators, where non-linearity is indicated by the threshold test (including the in-
terest rate spread, where the test results were not very decisive), we estimated a two-regime 
threshold model of the following form:14  


















X I 1 X I e
 
The results are given in table 6 and a graphical analysis is given in figures 4 to 6. 
Table 6: Threshold models: estimation results 
 
Variable  Estimations results (s.e. in parenthesis)  Estimated 
Threshold 
(τ) 
Growth forecast error 
Model I: Interest rate 
spread  () t t
* ) 69 . 0 ( ) 11 . 2 (
t t
) 32 . 0 ( ) 36 . 0 (
t
g
t X 36 . 1 17 . 3 I 1 X 51 . 0 45 . 0 I e ε +  

 
 ⋅ − − − +  

 
 ⋅ − + =  
-1.20 
Inflation forecast error 
Model II: Interest rate 
spread  () t t
* * * ) 14 . 0 ( * * ) 27 . 0 (
t t
) 31 . 0 ( ) 41 . 0 (
t t X 41 . 0 67 . 0 I 1 X 21 . 0 47 . 0 I e ε +  

 
 ⋅ + + − +  

 
 ⋅ + − =
π  
0.26 




* * * ) 31 . 0 ( * * * ) 42 . 0 (
t t
* * ) 23 . 0 ( ) 26 . 0 (
t t X 15 . 1 48 . 1 I 1 X 57 . 0 36 . 0 I e ε +  

 
 ⋅ + + − +  

 
 ⋅ − + =
π  
-0.26 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively. 
To begin with, for both growth and inflation forecast errors, we found reasonable interpre-
tions for the model with the interest rate spread. As the estimation outcome for model I 
shows, there is a regime ( t I 1− ) connected with a negative interest rate spread (below –1.20) 
which coincides with relatively high negative growth forecast errors and another regime 
where the errors are minor – see figure 4 for a graphical representation as well. The result is 
consistent with the literature on the leading indicator properties of the interest rate spread with 
regard to recessions (Estrella, Rodrigues and Schich 2003), which is probably not taken into 
account in a proper way when making the forecast. 
                                                                         
14 We used the program for grid search as described in Enders (2003). Discussion Papers   498 
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Figure 4: Regimes in Threshold Model I: Growth forecast error and interest rate spread 
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Figure 5: Regimes in Threshold Model II: Inflation forecast error and interest rate spread 
 
Inflation forecast error Interest rate spread (-1) Threshold
Shading if I(t) = 1










 Discussion Papers   498 
What explains "large" forecast errors? 
  20
Figure 6: Regimes in Threshold Model III: Inflation forecast error and monetary policy indicator 
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The results for model II shows that the interest rate spread might also be useful for explaining 
inflation forecast errors when the interest rate spread falls below 0.26. The coefficients for 
regime where  t I  is equal to 0 turn out to be significant, whereas the coefficients of the regime 
indicated by  1 It =  are statistically not significant. Figure 5 shows the graphical representa-
tion. The third estimated model for the relation between inflation forecast errors and the 
monetary policy stance indicator (model III) also indicates a statistically significant non-linear 
relationship between these variables. It relates mainly positive inflation forecast errors (infla-
tion underestimations) to periods of stimulating monetary policy (regime  0 It =  which indi-
cates periods of a monetary policy stance below a slightly negative threshold of –0.26). This 
result can also be seen when looking at Figure 6.15 
5  What explains "large" forecast errors? 
In the next step, we would like to differentiate between "large" and "small" overestimations 
and underestimations of growth and inflation. Taking a closer look at "large" forecast errors 
                                                                         
15 From the graphical representation it becomes obvious that the errors became smaller over time. The results 
might therefore be subject to structural breaks. We tested for structural breaks within the threshold models using 
the Hansen (1991) procedure available in RATS (STABTEST.SRC at www.estima.com). No structural break for 
the overall equation was detected in any case. Discussion Papers   498 
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might be very helpful in further understanding the reasons for errors. This makes it necessary 
to define the notion "large forecast errors" more precisely. We calculated the quartiles of the 
distribution of the respective forecast errors and count as "large" forecast errors the data 
points which are in the outer quartiles of the distribution on both tails. Errors in the first quar-
tile were counted as "large" underestimations, errors in the fourth quartile as "large" overesti-
mations. 
The probit approach as used by Estrella and Mishkin (1998) is then used to determine whether 
a variable helps to explain "large" forecast errors. The dependent variable utilised in this 
analysis is a dummy that takes the value 1 for a large error (outside interquartile range) and 0 
otherwise. Thus, the following equation is estimated: 
() ) ) X ( ( 1 , X 1 E Pr
'
1 t 1 t t β − Φ − = β = − −  
where Et is a dummy for the "large" forecast error, Φ is the cumulative distribution function 







occurs error forecast e arg l a if 1
Et  
As indicator variables for  1 t X −  which may help to explain forecast errors, we considered all 
the macroeconomic variables as described above. Discussion Papers   498 
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constant  1 β  p-value  1 β   Pseudo R
2
Short term interest rate  -1.61   0.00   0.15   0.06   0.08 
Real interest rate  -1.05   0.01   0.12   0.30   0.02 
Interest rate spread  -0.46   0.08  -0.20   0.10   0.06 
Oil price changes  -0.76   0.00   0.00   0.48   0.01 
Monetary policy indicator  -0.80   0.00   0.40   0.07   0.10 
Real exchange rate changes  -0.55   0.89   0.00   0.96   0.00 
Changes in OECD industrial 
production  -0.88   0.00   0.05   0.41   0.02 
 




constant  1 β  p-value  1 β   Pseudo R
2
Short term interest rate  -0.49   0.35  -0.04   0.64   0.00 
Real interest rate  -0.48   0.20  -0.09   0.47   0.01 
Interest rate spread  -0.90   0.00   0.12   0.37   0.02 
Monetary policy indicator  -0.96   0.00  -0.47   0.04   0.14 
Oil price changes  -0.66   0.00  -0.01   0.38   0.02 
Real exchange rate changes  -0.80   0.00   0.00   0.99   0.01 
Changes in OECD industrial 
production  -0.46   0.09 -0.09   0.13   0.06 
 
Panel (b): Large underestimations 
The interpretation of the results is complicated slightly by the fact that the coefficients cannot 
directly be interpreted as the marginal effect on the dependent variable. The effect of a small 
change of Xt-1 on the probability of making a "large" error , however, can be calculated from 
the estimated coefficients and a table for a cumulative standard normal distribution. 
We report the estimation results for overestimations and underestimations of growth and in-
flation forecasts respectively. For those indicators where we found significant effects, the 
effects of a variation of  1 t X − on ) E Pr( t  were plotted using probability response curves. Discussion Papers   498 
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constant  1 β  p-value  1 β   Pseudo R
2
Short term interest rate  -0.42   0.44  -0.07   0.46   0.01 
Real interest rate  -0.62   0.11  -0.07   0.58   0.01 
Interest rate spread  -0.91   0.00   0.08   0.56   0.01 
Monetary policy indicator  -0.73   0.00  -0.12   0.54   0.01 
Oil price changes  -0.74   0.00  -0.01   0.33   0.03 
Real exchange rate changes  -0.70   0.00   0.01   0.87   0.02 
Changes in OECD industrial 
production  -0.56   0.04 -0.08   0.16   0.05 
 




constant  1 β  p-value  1 β   Pseudo R
2
Short term interest rate  -1.26   0.02   0.09   0.24   0.03 
Real interest rate  -0.69   0.06  -0.01   0.95   0.00 
Interest rate spread  -0.58   0.03  -0.10   0.43   0.01 
Monetary policy indicator  -0.82   0.00  -0.03   0.86   0.00 
Oil price changes  -0.80   0.00   0.01   0.25   0.03 
Real exchange rate changes  -0.94   0.00   0.06   0.40   0.12 
Changes in OECD industrial 
production  -1.27   0.00   0.14   0.05   0.10 
 
Panel (b): Large underestimations 
We find that the short-term interest rate as well as the interest rate spread and the monetary 
policy indicator are related to large growth overestimations. This is in line with the literature 
on monetary policy effects, which states that periods of high interest rates seem to be con-
nected with unexpected recessions (see Ball and Croushore, 2003; Romer and Romer, 1989, 
2003) and therefore – as described in section II - "large" forecast errors. The monetary policy 
indicator is also related to "large" growth underestimations which indicates that monetary 
policy might be effective in both directions. Furthermore, we find that changes in the OECD 
industrial production are somehow related to "large" inflation errors – especially underestima-
tions. Discussion Papers   498 
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Having the probability responses at hand, it can be analysed at which value of Xt-1 the prob-
ability of making a "large" error reaches several values. The figures show e.g. that a monetary 
policy stance indicator (the deviation of the short-term real interest rate from its model-based Discussion Papers   498 
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equilibrium) above 2.02 would indicate a more than 50 % probability of a "large" growth 
overestimation, a value above 5.23 would indicate a more than 90 % chance of making a 
"large" growth overestimation and a value above 6.15 would indicate a more than 95  % 
chance of making a "large" growth overestimation. The respective threshold values (50 %, 
90 %, 95 %) for all other variables are also reported. 
6 Conclusion 
The paper analyses the reasons for departures from strong rationality of German business 
cycle forecasts based on annual observations form 1963 to 2004. To this end, we rely on fore-
casts from the joint forecast of the so-called "six leading" forecasting institutions. Both 
growth and inflation forecasts are investigated. 
We document a relationship between forecast errors and recessions. We also find that macro-
economic variables known at the period of the forecast are informative with regard to the 
forecast errors. This in turn leads to the rejection of rationality in the strong sense in some 
cases. We suspect that the relation between forecast errors and macroeconomic fundamentals 
is non-linear. Using several tests and models, some evidence for such a non-linearity is found. 
Based on threshold models, we show how the interest rate spread and monetary policy stance 
changes are related to growth and inflation forecast errors in a non-linear way. To get deeper 
insights we distinguish between over-and underestimations and introduce the concept of 
"large" errors. Evidence from probit models further supports the notion that some macroeco-
nomic fundamentals correlate to "large" overestimations and underestimations. Monetary 
disturbances seem to be important for "large" growth over- and underestimations. 
All in all, we conclude that some macroeconomic variables – especially monetary factors – 
which are known at the date of the forecast are related to forecast errors in a non-linear way. It 
raises doubts that professional forecasters are fully rational in that they always take into ac-
count the "appropriate" model of the economy. Maybe they do not even know the stance of 
the economy or maybe the model the forcasters have in mind is "wrong". Monetary policy 
might then have real effects just because it is unexpected by professional forecasters and peo-
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